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Toward a Formal Theory of Flexible Spatial Behavior:
Geometric Category Biases Generalize Across Pointing and Verbal Response Types
John P. Spencer and Vanessa R. Simmering
Department of Psychology, University of Iowa

Anne R. Schutte
Department of Psychology, University of Nebraska–Lincoln

Abstract: Three experiments tested whether geometric biases—biases away from perceived reference axes— reported in
spatial recall tasks with pointing responses generalized to a recognition task that required a verbal response. Seven-yearolds and adults remembered the location of a dot within a rectangle and then either reproduced its location or verbally
selected a matching choice dot from a set of colored options. Results demonstrated that geometric biases generalized
to verbal responses; however, the spatial span of the choice set influenced performance as well. These data suggest that
the same spatial memory process gives rise to both response types in this task. Simulations of a dynamic field model
buttress this claim. More generally, these results challenge accounts that posit separate spatial systems for motor and
verbal responses.
Keywords: spatial cognition, working memory, modeling, recognition, recall

People use information actively maintained in spatial working
memory (SWM) in a seemingly effortless and flexible way. In particular, people can generate a variety of different responses based
on location-related information held in working memory, including action responses (e.g., a reach toward the drawer to retrieve the
keys) and verbal responses (e.g., “the keys are in the desk drawer”). Moreover, people can generate these different types of responses in the face of different task demands. For instance, adults
can recall the locations of important objects in the absence of immediate perceptual cues (e.g., reaching for a coffee cup occluded
by a stack of papers). They can also recognize or select a target location from an array of visible options (e.g., selecting the correct
Styrofoam coffee cup on a table with several identical half-empty
cups).
These examples raise several fundamental questions: What is
the nature of the memory system (or systems) that underlies performance in these different situations, and what processes do people use to access SWM in the context of different response types
and different response cues? Three literatures have produced initial answers to these questions; however, the answers differ in type
(formal theories vs. verbal theories), content (one spatial memory
system vs. two), and extent (whether they address developmental
changes in spatial memory).
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Newcombe provided helpful comments on an earlier version of this article.

Spatial Recall and Formal Theories of Spatial Memory
One literature has focused on these questions by looking at the
characteristics of spatial memory in recall tasks. In these tasks,
participants are shown a single target location either in “empty”
space (e.g., Mclntyre, Stratta, & Lacquaniti, 1998; Soechting &
Flanders, 1989) or inside a geometrical figure (e.g., Huttenlocher,
Hedges, & Duncan, 1991; Huttenlocher, Newcombe, & Sandberg,
1994; Laeng, Peters, & McCabe, 1998; Werner & Diedrichsen,
2002). The target is then removed, there is a short delay, and participants are asked to reproduce the target location, typically by
pointing or placing an × at the remembered location.
One pervasive result across a number of studies of short-term
recall is that people use visible reference axes—lines, edges, and
symmetry axes—to help maintain location information in memory. Use of such axes provides a stable way to group or categorize
objects. Nevertheless, there is a cost: When people are asked to reproduce the location of a target near a reference axis after a delay,
they show geometric biases’, that is, responses become systematically distorted away from the reference axis. For instance, Huttenlocher et al. (1994) asked 10- 11-year-old children and adults to reproduce the locations of dots within a rectangular frame. Responses were biased away from the left and right edges of the frame
and away from the midline symmetry axis (for related errors, see
Engebretson & Huttenlocher, 1996; Huttenlocher et al., 1991;
Laeng et al., 1998; Nelson & Chaiklin, 1980; Sandberg, Huttenlocher, & Newcombe, 1996; Schiano & Tversky, 1992; Tversky
& Schiano, 1989). It is important that recent data have shown that
geometric biases emerge continuously during short-term delays.
Spencer and Hund (2002, 2003) reported that geometric biases increased systematically across delays of 0–20 s, and Diedrichsen
and colleagues (e.g., Werner & Diedrichsen, 2002) found geometric biases at delays as short as 50 ms.
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In addition to these empirical findings, the spatial recall literature has contributed two formal models of spatial memory—the
category adjustment (CA) model (Huttenlocher et al., 1991) and
the dynamic field theory (DFT; Schutte, Spencer, & Schöner,
2003; Spencer & Schöner, 2003). According to the CA model,
people represent the fine-grained location of a target—that is, the
direction and distance of the target from a reference location—
and the category in which the target is located (Huttenlocher et al.,
1991). Categories are formed by dividing space through the use
of visible and mentally imposed axes. These category boundaries,
along with the central, or prototypical, member of each category,
are stored in memory. When asked to reproduce a target location,
people combine their fine-grained and categorical representations
on the basis of the certainty of the fine-grained information. Consequently, they produce errors away from reference axes and toward spatial prototypes because all locations within a region are
weighted with the same prototype. For example, in the rectangledot task, participants divide the rectangle into two spatial categories with prototypes at the centers of the left and right halves. After a short delay, memory for an item in, for instance, the left category is weighted with the left prototype producing an error in this
direction..
Although the CA model effectively captures the pattern of bias
seen in spatial recall tasks, it does not specify the time-dependent
processes that underlie the increase in geometric bias over delays
(see Schutte & Spencer, 2002; Spencer & Hund, 2003; Werner &
Diedrichsen, 2002). The DFT captures these processes by using a
neurally plausible network model that specifies how location-related activation is maintained in SWM during short-term delays
(Spencer, Lipinski, & Samuelson, in press; Spencer & Schöner,
2003, 2006). Neurons in the DFT are spatially tuned such that neurons with similar “preferred” locations excite one another, whereas
neurons tuned to very different preferred locations inhibit one another (for neurophysiological evidence of this type of interaction,
see, e.g., Georgopoulos, Taira, & Lukashin, 1993; Goldman-Rakic, 1995). As a result of this locally excitatory/ laterally inhibitory form of neural interaction, the model can sustain a localized
“peak” of activation even in the absence of target-related input.
This gives the DFT a robust form of working memory (see also
Compte, Brunei, Goldman-Rakic, & Wang, 2000; Renart, Song, &
Wang, 2003). It is important to note, however, that the DFT also
captures how people use perceived frames of reference such as a
midline symmetry axis (Spencer et al., in press). At the start of
each trial, the model establishes “reference” peaks that are calibrated with perceived frames of reference in the task space. These
reference peaks leave traces of activation in long-term memory.
This allows the model to remember target-related information in a
calibrated reference frame and to recall previous reference frames
at a later time. The cost of this mechanism, however, is that reference-related information can bias information in working memory. In particular, self-sustaining peaks near a reference frame are
stabilized by information in long-term memory, whereas peaks to
the left or right of a reference frame are repelled from the frame
because of strong laterally inhibitory interactions.
As this survey of the CA and DFT models demonstrates, both
models effectively capture participants’ geometric biases in spatial
recall tasks. But how general are these models? Can they account
for behavior in different tasks, tasks that probe memory in different ways or require a different response type? And how pervasive

are geometric biases? Do they emerge only in artificial recall tasks
when people must point to a location in empty space? These questions remain unanswered. As such, it is not clear whether these
models provide a robust framework for examining the flexibility
of spatial cognition.

Sensorimotor and Verbal Response Types:
Two Spatial Memory Systems?
A second literature has examined the nature of the spatial memory system underlying flexible performance across contexts by
comparing response errors when participants generate different
response types, most notably, pointing versus verbal responses
(e.g., Bridgeman, Gemmer, Forsman, & Huemer, 2000; Brungart,
Rabinowitz, & Durlach, 2000). Here, there is some consensus that
different response types tap different spatial memory systems: a
“sensorimotor” system that encodes locations in the service of motor actions and a “cognitive” system that encodes locations in the
service of verbal responses (Bridgeman, 1999; Bridgeman et al.,
2000; Brungart et al., 2000). For instance, Brungart et al. (2000)
asked adults to reconstruct a remembered location immediately after target presentation by using one of four response types—direct pointing or three types of verbal response. Pointing responses were the most accurate, yet unlike the verbal response types,
such responses were sensitive to response delays (see also Spencer & Hund, 2002; Werner & Diedrichsen, 2002). Brungart et al.
concluded that the motor system relies on a location memory that
degrades whereas the cognitive system relies on a stable verbal
report formed at target presentation (see Bridgeman et al., 2000;
Bridgeman, Kirch, & Sperling, 1981; Bridgeman, Peery, & Anand,
1997; Proffitt, Bhalla, Gossweiler, & Midgett, 1995).
Results from Crawford, Regier, and Huttenlocher (2000) also
suggest that different representational systems underlie sensorimotor and verbal response types. When adults were asked to apply a
spatial preposition (e.g., above) to a display depicting a target and
a referent object, their judgments were most accurate along the
cardinal axes of the display (vertical and horizontal). By contrast,
pointing responses after a delay showed geometric biases away
from the cardinal axes and toward diagonal axes. These researchers concluded that the representational systems that underlie verbal and pointing responses rely on different “prototypical” axes in
the task space (for an alternative interpretation of these results, see
Spencer et al., in press).
The proposal that different memory systems underlie sensorimotor and verbal response types makes sense given the demands
placed on memory by these two response types. Pointing responses
must be guided by continuous, metric spatial information, whereas verbal responses are categorical, coarse, and symbolic in nature
(Huttenlocher et al., 1991; Jackendoff, 1996; Talmy, 1983). Nevertheless, this view of two representational formats raises a fundamental challenge: How do people effortlessly and flexibly generate different response types—in some cases, combining elements
of both systems at very short response times (see Bridgeman et al.,
2000)—given the apparently incompatible nature of these spatial
codes? Answers to this question require formal models that specify the interface or transduction process that integrates these codes;
however, there are currently no models that specify such details
(although see Jackendoff, 1996, for ideas in this direction), and
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neither the CA model nor the DFT has been extended to address
performance in verbal tasks.

Developmental Changes in Spatial Memory
The two literatures discussed above yield unique insights into
the flexible spatial performance of adults, insights that pose tough
challenges for theories of spatial memory. A third literature presents yet another challenge: Spatial memory theories must explain
how effortless, flexible spatial performance develops over time.
At face value, the development of sensorimotor and verbal spatial abilities seems to be a case of discontinuous development—
sensorimotor spatial abilities emerge in infancy and show rapid
change thereafter (e.g., Acredolo, 1985; Newcombe, Huttenlocher,
& Learmonth, 1999; Piaget, 1954), whereas verbal spatial abilities emerge much later, reaching proficiency by 5 to 7 years of age
(e.g., Craton, Elicker, Plumert, & Pick, 1990; Hermer-Vazquez,
Spelke, & Katsnelson, 1999; Plumert, Ewert, & Spear, 1995;
Plumert & Nichols-Whitehead, 1996). Consistent with this discontinuous view, Hermer-Vazquez, Moffet, and Munkholm (2001)
showed that 5- to 7-year-old children encode spatial relations in
new ways once they become proficient at using spatial language.
In particular, spatial language helps children combine geometric and nongeometric, featural information following a disorientation procedure that disrupts children’s ability to use dead-reckoning to find a hidden object. Without spatial language proficiency, children rely solely on geometric cues in this task. Additional
evidence from Hermer-Vazquez et al. (1999) has shown that spatial language plays an important role in adults’ flexible integration
of geometric and nongeometric information as well. When adults
were required to engage in a verbal shadowing task that blocked
their use of spatial language, they relied solely on geometric information to find a hidden object after being disoriented. This was
not the case, however, when adults engaged in nonverbal shadowing of a continuous rhythm. In this case, adults combined geometric and nongeometric cues.
Although data from Hermer-Vazquez et al. (1999, 2001) are consistent with the discontinuous view, other data suggest that sensorimotor and linguistic abilities coevolve in early development.
Learmonth, Newcombe, and Huttenlocher (2001) showed that 17to 24-month-olds can use nongeometric information to disambiguate a hiding location in the disorientation task developed by Hermer and Spelke (1994, 1996), provided that the task space is large
enough and the nongeometric cues (i.e., landmarks) are salient and
spatially stable. Additionally, cross-linguistic evidence has shown
that infants learn to selectively attend to spatial distinctions made
in their native language as they learn language. Hespos and Spelke (2004) showed that, at 5 months, infants from English-speaking
households were sensitive to the tight- versus loose-fitting containment relations distinguished in Korean. By 18 to 24 months, however, children’s attention to spatial relations begins to correspond
to distinctions made in their native language (Choi, McDonough,
Bowerman, & Mandler, 1999). Considered together, results from
these studies suggest a more continuous, coevolving view of the
development of sensorimotor and verbal spatial abilities.
This continuity theme has also been echoed in the spatial recall
literature. Recent evidence has suggested that two types of spatial recall biases—A-not-B-type biases and geometric biases—
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develop via continuous changes in process over development
(Schutte, 2004; Schutte et al., 2003; Spencer & Hund, 2003). For
instance. Spencer and colleagues (Schutte et al., 2003; Spencer
& Schutte, 2004; Spencer, Smith, & Thelen, 2001) have shown
that, following repeated hiding and finding events at an “A” location, 2-to 6-year-old children show biases toward A when
searching for a hidden object at a nearby “B” location. This bias
is similar to the Piagetian A-not-B error made by 8- to 10-monthold infants (Piaget, 1954; Smith, Thelen, Titzer, & McLin, 1999;
Thelen, Schöner, Scheier, & Smith, 2001). It is important to note
that Schutte et al. (2003) quantitatively fit changes in such biases by systematically narrowing and strengthening the local excitation/ lateral inhibition function that governs neural interaction
in the DFT. This was accomplished via continuous change in a
single model parameter over development (for related efforts to
capture developmental changes in geometric biases with continuous changes in parameters of the DFT, see Schutte, 2004; Spencer & Hund, 2003).

Overview of the Present Study
Considered together, the three literatures discussed above raise
fundamental questions about the nature and development of the
spatial system (or systems) that underlies the generation of sensorimotor and verbal responses in different spatial tasks. The spatial
recall literature offers two formal theories of spatial memory and
key insights about continuous changes in memory processes over
development; however, it is unclear whether these models generalize beyond sensorimotor responses in recall tasks. The two-systems literature offers a broader view of spatial performance but no
formal theories to explain how a two-systems view can produce
the unique characteristics of pointing and verbal response types
in some tasks yet fast, efficient integration in others. The developmental literature echoes these themes. There is evidence of integration: Sensorimotor and linguistic spatial abilities appear to coevolve in early development. Yet there is also evidence that verbal
abilities make a unique contribution to children’s spatial abilities.
Thus, a central challenge is to understand how the balance between integration and uniqueness is achieved, that is, how a spatial memory system can flexibly integrate sensorimotor and verbal
response types yet still produce behavioral signatures unique to
each type. We contend that formal models can play an important
role in addressing this challenge by highlighting the limitations of
current views. For instance, formal models of a two-systems view
must deal head-on with the problem of incompatible spatial codes
if they are to engage in realistic, real-time— behavior. By contrast,
formal models that pose an integrated-systems view must explain
how behavior in the same task can differ when a sensorimotor versus a verbal response is required.
In this study, we took a first step toward expanding the role of
formal theory in the spatial memory literature by asking whether the processes at work in the CA and DFT models generalize
to tasks in which participants must make a verbal, recognitionbased response. In particular, we asked whether one type of bias—
geometric bias—observed in spatial recall tasks with pointing responses generalizes to a recognition task with a verbal response.
In addition, we asked whether such generalization depends on
linguistic expertise by examining the performance of adults and
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7-year-old children. We selected 7-year-olds because previous research has shown that 7 years is the youngest age at which children begin to subdivide geometric figures along single spatial dimensions (Sandberg et al., 1996). It is important to note that this
age is also within the range examined by Hermer-Vazquez et al.
(2001). If geometric biases generalize to verbal recognition tasks,
it suggests that the processes that produce the bias—processes formalized in spatial recall models—might be general as well. Results from three experiments suggest that this is the case but in a
nontrivial sense: Geometric biases occur in both types of tasks but
only in particular situations for each age group. Thus, in the General Discussion section, we consider whether these models can
capture both the integration and the uniqueness of these response
and task types. This sets the stage for a more general, processbased account of SWM.

Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we used a modified version of the rectangledot task described previously. On each trial, 7-year-old and adult
participants were shown a target dot within a rectangle followed
by a short memory delay. After the delay, participants were cued
to make either a sensorimotor response—to draw an × at the
remembered location—or a verbal “choice” response. On these
choice trials, participants were shown a set of colored dots, one
of which was in the original target location. They were instructed
to say the color of the dot that matched the target. Thus, some trials required participants to recall the target location and generate a
motor response; other trials probed memory with a recognition or
choice set (colored dots) and required a verbal response. It is important to note that participants did not know which response and
task type would be cued at the end of each trial. Consequently, the
task space, remembered locations, and memory delays were identical across tasks.
If geometric biases are unique to sensorimotor responses in spatial recall tasks, participants’ responses on the draw trials should
replicate the pattern of error reported by Huttenlocher et al. (1994);
however, this pattern of error should not be observed on choice trials. Indeed, on the basis of previous studies showing that verbal
responses remain stable during short-term delays (e.g., Bridgeman
et al., 1997; Brungart et al., 2000) and that 7-year-olds are proficient at spatial language (Hermer-Vazquez et al., 2001), we expected participants to be relatively accurate in this task. It is also
possible, however, that participants will show geometric biases on
the choice task. This would demonstrate that this class of bias is
not unique to a sensorimotor spatial system, suggesting that the
processes formalized in the CA and DFT models extend to verbal
responses in recognition tasks as well.

through an introductory psychology course and received research participation credit. Each group consisted of roughly half male and half female
participants.
Apparatus. Participants sat across from the experimenter at a long rectangular table (approximately 55 cm tall, measuring 165 cm × 53 cm on
top; see Figure 1). For most of the sessions with children, a parent chose
to accompany the child for the session; in these cases, the parent sat in a
chair to the left and behind the child, out of the child’s field of vision. In
front of the participant, 9.5 cm from the edge of the table, was a small
frame (21.6 cm × 5.6 cm along the outside edges) in which stimulus cards
were presented. To the experimenter’s left were an opaque stimulus card
box and a button. When pushed, the button helped raise the stimulus cards
out of the frame. To eliminate the possibility that other features of the
room might be used as landmarks, a white canvas curtain surrounded the
experimental area from floor to ceiling. The dimensions of the space within the curtain were roughly 2.4 m × 2.1 m.
Five types of stimulus cards were used: target cards, delay cards, draw
response cards, choice response cards, and feedback cards. All cards measured 20 cm × 4 cm, were free of extraneous marks, and were white cardstock, with the exception of feedback cards, which were transparent plastic. Target cards displayed a gray dot, 1 mm in diameter, at a target location. Both delay and draw response cards were blank, though delay cards
were made of heavier cardstock to ensure that targets could not be seen
through them. Choice response cards showed five differently colored dots,
all 1 mm in diameter, spaced 5 mm from each other. From left to right, the
dots were colored black, green, orange, blue, and red. The location of the
five dots varied from trial to trial such that one dot was in the target location on each trial. Feedback cards contained a circle, 3 mm in diameter,
centered at the target location. When laid over a response card, the circle
indicated the target location for a given trial.
Procedure. Each session began with a demonstration to ensure that the
participant understood the task. Figure 2 shows the sequence of card presentations during this trial. The experimenter presented the target card in
the frame and asked the participant to remember the location. Then the experimenter covered the target card with the delay card and instructed the
participant to look up from the frame while counting aloud to 5 (for children) or 10 (for adults). After the delay, the experimenter sequentially presented both a choice response card and a draw response card; the order
of the two response types was randomized across participants. When the

Method
Participants. Participants were 30 seven-year-olds (M age = 7.52
years, SD = 0.73 months) and 30 adults (M age = 19.27 years, SD = 9.52
months). Two additional children and 1 additional adult participated, but
data from these participants were not included in the final analyses because of experimenter error. Potential child participants were drawn from
a database at a large midwestern university; their names were originally obtained from birth records in the area. Parents of these children were
contacted by letter and then by a follow-up phone call. Children received
gifts worth approximately $3-$4 for participating. Adults were recruited

Figure 1. Setup of the experimental room. The experimenter presented stimulus cards (stored in the container at B) in the frame in front of
the participant (see A). The curtain around the room eliminated potential landmarks. When present for children’s sessions, parents sat in the
comer of the room, out of the view of the children.
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1. Target Presentation

2. Delay (5 s for children,
10 s for adults)

3. Choice Response Card

OR
Draw Response Card

4. Feedback

Figure 2. Event sequence for each trial. Participants were shown only one
type of response card (i.e., choice or draw) on nondemonstration trials.
choice response card was presented, participants were asked to say the
color of the dot that was in the same location as the target dot. The experimenter then repeated aloud and recorded the color the participant named.
Next, participants were asked to name all of the colors from left to right,
to ensure that they were discernible (and that the participants were not color-blind). When the draw response card was presented, participants were
asked to draw an × where they remembered the target dot being. In the final step of the card sequence, the experimenter placed the feedback card
over the response card and praised the participant’s performance. Before
proceeding, the experimenter asked whether the participant understood
the task. If the participant did not understand the trial, the demonstration
was repeated. Once the participant understood the task, the experimenter
began the practice trials.
Each participant completed 4 practice trials, presented in random order.
The sequence of events on these trials was similar to that of the demonstration, but only one type of response card was presented on each trial
(note that feedback was given on every trial). Two of the practice trials
were choice trials, and 2 were draw trials. After the 4 practice trials, the
participant completed 26 test trials and 4 control trials (see the Experimental design section), presented in random order. The sequence of events in
these trials was the same as for the practice trials. If a child participant
appeared to be distracted during the session, a break was offered, though
most children did not need breaks. Adult participants and parents were debriefed at the end of the session.
Experimental design. Thirteen locations were used as targets for the test
trials. From the left edge of the card, the targets were at 12.5-mm intervals
beginning at 25 mm (ending at 175 mm) and centered vertically on the
card (see Figure 2). These locations were a subset of those used by Huttenlocher et al. (1994).1 Each target location was used once for a choice
trial and once for a draw trial. Different locations were used for demonstration, practice, and control trials. For these trials, target locations were
randomly selected from the 11 locations in between (6.25 mm) the target
locations; these locations were not repeated.
For choice response cards, we randomly selected which colored dot
would match the target for that trial. To allow participants to err in either
direction on choice test trials, the dot that matched the target was selected
from the three central dots rather than from either of the end dots. Given
that this might cause participants to adopt a strategy in which they avoided
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the two end choices (because these choices were never correct on the test
trials), we included control trials in which the end dots always matched the
target. The end choices were also randomly selected as correct responses
for some of the practice trials. Overall, the end choices were correct on approximately 25% of the choice trials.
Method of analysis. To compare performance across locations and response types, responses were coded as errors from the target. Draw responses were measured from the target location to the center of the ×
drawn by the participant. Leftward errors were assigned negative values,
and rightward errors were assigned positive values. Choice responses were
calculated by measuring the distance between the dot that matched the target and the dot selected by the participant (leftward errors were negative).
Thus, if the center dot (orange) matched the target and the participant selected the dot farthest to the left (black), the resultant error would be —10
mm. Note that because the end choices never matched the target on test
trials, the largest possible error was ±15 mm. Control and practice trials
were not included in any analyses.
Given that choice response errors were categorical (±15 mm, ±10 mm,
±5 mm, or 0 mm) whereas draw response errors were continuous, draw errors were converted to categorical values. Specifically, values were rounded to the nearest 5 mm and truncated to ± 15 mm. Statistical analyses revealed no significant differences between continuous and categorical draw
errors. Thus, the categorical draw errors were used in all analyses.

Results
Figure 3 shows mean errors for both response types separately
for children (Figure 3A) and adults (Figure 3B). In general, errors
were smallest near the center of the rectangle (100-mm location)
and were biased away from the center and the left and right edges.
For instance, at 75 mm, participants made relatively large errors
to the left (negative values), and errors decreased as locations approached 100 mm. Conversely, beyond 100 mm, errors were rightward (positive values) and increased as they approached 125 mm.
Finally, adults’ errors were generally smaller than 7-year-olds’ errors despite the fact that adults had to remember the target location
for a longer delay (10 s vs. 5 s for the 7-year-olds), and both age
groups showed smaller errors on choice response trials than draw
response trials.
To analyze these data, we conducted a three-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA) with response type (choice or draw) and location (25–175 mm) as within-subject factors and age (7 years or
adult) as a between-subjects factor. This analysis revealed significant main effects of location, Wilks’s Λ = .23, F(12,47) = 12.80,
p < .001, and response type, Wilks’s Λ = .86, F(1, 58) = 9.54, p
< .01. Additionally, there was a significant Location × Age interaction, Wilks’s Λ = .62, F(12, 47) = 2.43, p < .05; a significant
Response Type × Location interaction, Wilks’s Λ = .38, F(12,
47) = 6.53, p < .001; and a significant Response Type × Location
× Age interaction, Wilks’s Λ = .60, F(12, 47) = 2.70, p < .01.
To explore these results further, we separately conducted simple effects tests for the adults and the 7-year-olds. Tests of simple
effects for the children showed a significant main effect of location, F(12, 348) = 9.06, p < .001, and a significant Response
Type × Location interaction, F(12, 348) = 4.49, p < .001.
1 Huttenlocher et al. (1994) also used locations 12.5 mm and 187.5 mm
from the left edge of the card. These locations were not used as targets
here because they did not allow enough room for the choices presented on
the choice response cards.
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Additional tests of simple effects revealed a significant effect of
location for both choice responses, F(12, 348) = 3.35, p < .001,
and draw responses, F(12, 348) = 8.51, p < .001. Thus, the positive and negative deviations across locations apparent in Figure
3A for both choice and draw responses were statistically reliable.
Furthermore, there were significant differences in error across response type at five locations: 25 mm, F(1, 29) = 17.91, p < .001;
62.5 mm, F(1, 29) = 4.28, p < .05; 75 mm, F(1, 29) = 9.26, p <
.01; 87.5 mm, F(1, 29) = 5.01, p < .05; and 175 mm, F(1, 29) =
15.03, p < .001 (see locations marked with arrows in Figure 3A).
At all of these locations, draw errors were significantly larger than
choice errors.
Simple effects tests for adults showed significant main effects of
both response type, F(1, 29) = 10.59, p < .01, and location, F(12,

348) = 5.61, p < .001, as well as a significant Response Type ×
Location interaction, F(12, 348) = 2.88, p < .01. Additional tests
of simple effects revealed a significant effect of location for both
choice responses, F(12, 348) = 2.64, p < .01, and draw responses,
F(12, 348) = 5.56, p < .001. As with the 7-year-olds, the positive
and negative deviations across locations apparent in Figure 3B for
both choice and draw responses were statistically reliable. Moreover, there were significant effects of response type at four locations: 50 mm, F(1, 29) = 7.28, p < .05; 87.5 mm, F(1, 29) = 10.76,
p < .01; 150 mm, F(1, 29) = 12.43, p < .01; and 175 mm, F(1, 29)
= 14.43, p < .01 (see locations marked with arrows in Figure 3B).
As with the 7-year-olds, draw errors were larger than choice errors
for three of these locations. The difference at 150 mm was caused
by errors in opposite directions across response types.

Figure 3. Mean choice and draw errors for (A) 7-year-olds (7yr) and (B) adults (AD) across the 13 target
locations in Experiment 1. Positive values indicate rightward errors, and negative values indicate leftward
errors. Arrows indicate locations at which response types differed significantly. Errors bars reflect plus or
minus one standard error.
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Polynomial curve-fitting. In general, our data followed the same
sinusoidal trend reported by Huttenlocher et al. (1994). To verify this result, we fit polynomial curves to the data from each response type and each age group separately (see also Huttenlocher
et al., 1994). Table 1 shows multiple correlation squared (R2) values for the fits of quintic, cubic, and linear functions separately
for each age and response type as well as significant differences
in the fits of these curves. As with data from Huttenlocher et al.
(1994), we found the best fit for children’s draw responses was
obtained by a quintic function, although the fit of the cubic function was also quite good.2 For adults’ draw data, both quintic and
cubic functions fit well, although only the fit of the cubic function
was significantly better than chance (the fit of the quintic function was marginal). The cubic function also fit significantly better than a linear function. Thus, both sets of curve fits for the draw
responses showed sinusoidal patterns similar to those reported by
Huttenlocher et al. (1994). The difference in fits between the age
groups likely reflects adults’ more accurate responses, particularly at the edges of the stimulus set, which would affect the fit of a
quintic function.
Because a verbal, recognition-based response has not been examined in this type of task, it is important to investigate whether
these responses show the same sinusoidal pattern. If so, it would
suggest that similar processes underlie sensorimotor, recall-based
and verbal, recognition-based spatial memory errors. This was not
the case for children’s choice responses. As can be seen in Table
1, there were no significant effects among the fits of quintic, cubic, and linear functions. Thus, there may be different processes underlying the generation of verbal versus pointing responses at 7 years of age. For adults’ choice data, a quintic function fit
significantly better than a linear function, and all three functions
fit adults’ choice data significantly better than chance. This finding suggests that, although adults were significantly more accurate in the choice task, similar processes underlie the generation
of both types of response for this age group.
According to the CA and DFT models, the sinusoidal pattern
evident in participants’ responses is caused by systematic distortions in memory that reach their peak near locations of 25, 75,
125, and 175 mm (the inflection points of the polynomial curves).
This allows us to bring together results from the ANOVA and
curve fits. Specifically, the locations at which response types differed (see Figure 3) were generally near the inflection points of
the polynomial curves for both children and adults.
Table 1
R2 Values of Polynomial Curve Fits in Experiment 1
Response

Quintic function Cubic function Linear function

7-year-olds’ draw
7-year-olds’ choice
Adults’ draw
Adults’ choice

.912a >>
.453
.699 b
.912 a

.727 a >
.343
.643 a >
.631 a

.011
.163
.041
.392 a

Note. Quintic functions marked with >> fit significantly better (p < .05)
than both cubic, FS(2, 7) > 4.74, and linear, FS(4, 7) > 4.12, functions.
Quintic functions marked with > fit significantly better than only a linear function. Cubic functions marked with > fit significantly better than
linear functions, FS(2, 9) > 4.26.
a Curve fits significantly greater than chance, quintic F (5,7) > 3.97, cubic
S
FS(3, 9) > 3.86, and linear FS (1, 11) > 4.84.
b Curve fit marginally better than chance, F(5, 7) = 3.25, p = .078.
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Percentage of correct responses on choice trials. In addition to
assessing the magnitude of error on choice trials, we evaluated the
frequency of correct choices. A t test comparing the mean percentage of correct responses across the two age groups revealed
a significant difference, t(58) = –5.90, p < .001. Adults were correct more often on choice trials (M = 56.9%) than children were
(M = 30.0%). Additionally, t tests comparing the performance of
each group to chance (20%) indicated that both age groups performed at levels significantly above chance: children, t(29) = 3.78,
p < .01; adults, t(29) = 9.93, p < .001.

Discussion
As in Huttenlocher et al.’s (1994) study, both children’s and
adults’ draw responses were biased away from the edges and the
midline of the rectangle. This sinusoidal pattern is consistent with
both the DFT and CA models and suggests that draw responses
for both ages are driven by the same underlying process (see also
Spencer & Hund, 2003). By contrast, choice responses did not
consistently follow this pattern. There were significantly smaller
errors on the choice task for both age groups at locations near the
inflection points of the sinusoidal draw pattern. More striking, the
7-year-olds’ choice responses were not significantly fit by either
quintic or cubic functions. Two factors might explain these differences across response types and age groups.
The first reason why children and adults might rely less on geometric category information in the choice task is because there is
a bias to use nonspatial information when a verbal response is required. Many verbal statements about objects in the local surround
emphasize nonspatial information such as object features. For
young children who are still mastering language, it may be less
apparent that geometric category information is useful in a verbal
response task. Consequently, they may rely primarily on their metric memory when selecting from the set of colored choices. Data
from a study by Plumert and Nichols-Whitehead (1996) are consistent with this view. When asked to give directions about how to
find a hidden object in a dollhouse, 3- and 4-year-olds were more
likely to offer information about the features of a nearby object
(e.g., the shoe is hidden under the hat with the blue ribbon) rather
than information about locations (e.g., the shoe is hidden under the
hat next to the rocking chair). Adults, by contrast, tended to refer
to both object features and spatial relations. This is consistent with
results from the present study in which children showed little evidence of geometric bias in the choice task whereas adults showed
a sinusoidal pattern that was weaker than in the draw task.
A second reason why both age groups showed smaller errors on
the choice task is that the added spatial structure provided by the
choice dots helped participants generate more accurate responses. Consider, for instance, how one might account for choice responses by using the DFT. According to this model, activation in
SWM drifts away from reference axes during delays, and recall

2

Because Huttenlocher et al. (1994, Experiment 6) did not round
and truncate their data, we analyzed the continuous draw data to allow
for a direct comparison with the results found in this study. Huttenlocher et al. reported that a quintic function provided the best fit to their
data (R2 = .90). This fit is comparable to the fit of a quintic function to
children’s continuous draw data in the present experiment (R2 = .83).
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responses are generated by pointing to the location associated
with maximal activation. In the choice task, it is possible that people use a similar process—they pick the choice that most closely
matches the location associated with maximal activation in working memory. This would produce identical errors across response
types provided that there is a choice dot in the spatial location currently represented in working memory. If, however, there were
substantial drift in working memory—as occurs near the inflection points of the sinusoidal pattern—it is possible that none of
the choices would overlap with the remembered location. In this
case, participants might pick the closest match or simply guess.
This would result in smaller errors on the choice task provided
that the choices clustered close to the target location (i.e., the spatial span was small). On average, this was the case in the present
experiment, given that the five choices were separated by 5 mm,
and the correct choice was constrained to be the second, third, or
fourth dot. We tested competing predictions of these alternative
accounts in Experiment 2.

Experiment 2
During the choice trials of Experiment 1, participants selected
from a set of five choices separated by 5 mm. To test the competing predictions of the verbal bias and choice span accounts, we
increased the number of choices from five to nine (the choices
remained separated by 5 mm). Thus, the choices now covered a
40-mm spatial span instead of 20 mm. If participants have a bias
against using geometric category information in verbal tasks, this
manipulation should have no effect relative to Experiment 1. If,
however, the improved performance on choice trials in Experiment 1 was caused by a mismatch between a drifting memory and
a nonoverlapping and more accurate choice set, then this manipulation should make choice responses more similar to draw responses.

Method
Participants. Participants were 30 seven-year-olds {M age = 7.57
years, SD = 1.05 months) and 31 adults (M age = 18.76 years, SD = 9.89
months). Data from 2 additional children were excluded, 1 because she
did not complete the task, and 1 because his draw responses were not clear
enough to be coded. All other participant details were as in Experiment 1.
Apparatus. All details of the apparatus were the same as in Experiment
1 except for the choice response cards. These cards had nine choices (rather than five) presented 5 mm apart and covering a 40-mm span. To keep
the choices verbally identifiable, different colored squares and triangles
were used. From left to right, the symbols were a black square, a green triangle, a red square, a blue triangle, an orange square, a black triangle, a
green square, a red triangle, and a blue square. Participants were asked to
say both the color and the symbol type on the choice trials.
Procedure. All procedural details were the same as in Experiment 1.
Experimental design. As in Experiment 1, the locations used for practice and control trials were randomly selected from locations in between
the target locations (6.25 mm). Targets were presented at only 11 locations—the 25-mm and 175-mm locations were not used because there
was not enough room to include nine choices between the target and the
edge of the card. We also increased the number of control trials to eight
to further reduce the likelihood that participants might adopt a strategy
in which they avoided selecting the two end choices. In Experiment 1, 7year-olds’ percentage of correct responses on test trials was significantly

above chance. This was not the case, however, on control trials (when end
choices were correct), t(29) = 0.92, p = .36, suggesting that the children
might have been strategically avoiding the end choices. For comparison,
adults performed significantly above chance on both test and control trials, t(29) = 7.12, p < .001.
Method of analysis. Choice responses were coded using the method described in Experiment 1. However, because the choices now covered a
greater spatial span, the maximum error was ±35 mm. Continuous draw
responses were coded as in Experiment 1. Categorical draw errors were
rounded to the nearest 5 mm and truncated to ±35 mm (rather than to
± 15 mm as in Experiment 1). Again, statistical comparisons revealed no
significant differences between continuous and categorical draw errors.
Thus, categorical draw errors were used in all analyses.

Results
Figure 4 shows mean errors for both response types separately for children (Figure 4A) and adults (Figure 4B). Responses followed the sinusoidal pattern seen in Experiment 1, with small errors at the center of the rectangle (100 mm) and near the centers
of each half (50 mm and 150 mm). In contrast to Experiment 1,
however, errors on both choice and draw trials showed a clear sinusoidal pattern for both age groups. These data were analyzed
using a three-way ANOVA with response type (choice or draw)
and location (37.5–162.5 mm) as within-subject factors and age
(7 years or adult) as a between-subjects factor. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of location, Wilks’s Λ = .34, F(10,
50) = 9.56, p < .001. There were no significant effects of response
type or age. These data strongly suggest that the same processes
underlie the generation of both verbal and pointing responses in
this task. However, considered together with Experiment 1, it is
likely that the details of the response context (e.g., spatial span of
choices) matter as well.
To examine this issue directly, we compared the choice and
draw responses across experiments. Specifically, for each response
type we conducted an ANOVA with location (37.5–162.5 mm) as
a within-subject factor and age (7 years or adult) and experiment
(1 or 2) as between-subjects factors. Because we used a subset of
data from each experiment, we report only significant effects of
experiment. Note that the data from trials to the two extreme target
locations in Experiment 1 were excluded from these analyses. The
ANOVA examining draw responses across experiments revealed
no significant experiment effects. Thus, as expected, draw errors
were comparable across experiments. By contrast, the ANOVA
comparing choice responses revealed a significant Location × Experiment interaction, F(10, 1170) = 2.24, p < .05. Simple effects
tests comparing choice responses in Experiments 1 and 2 at each
location separately revealed a significant effect of experiment at
two locations near the inflection points of the sinusoidal pattern—
at 75 mm (Experiment 1: M = 0.00, Experiment 2: M = –3.21),
F(1, 119) = 5.01, p < .05, and 137.5 mm (Experiment 1: M = 0.92,
Experiment 2: M = 3.69), F(1, 119) = 4.56, p < .05. At both locations, errors were larger in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1.
Polynomial curve-fitting. Although the data in Figure 4 show
a clear sinusoidal pattern, it was important to verify this statistically. Table 2 shows R2 values for the fits of quintic, cubic, and
linear functions fit separately for each age and response type as
well as significant differences in the fits of these curves. Across all
four sets of analyses, quintic and cubic functions provided excel-
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lent fits to the data. Relative to Experiment 1, the polynomial
trends in 7-year-olds’ draw responses3 and adults’ choice and draw
responses were comparable, although these trends were stronger
in the present experiment. Moreover, 7-year-olds showed a strong
polynomial trend in their choice responses in the present experiment but not in Experiment 1.
Percentage of correct responses on choice trials. A t test comparing the mean percentage of correct responses across the two age
groups revealed a significant difference for children and adults,
t(59) = –6.66, p < .001. As in Experiment 1, adults (M = 48.4%)
were correct more often than children (M = 16.4%). Additionally,
t tests comparing the performance of each group to chance performance (11%) indicated that both age groups performed at levels
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significantly above chance: children, t(29) =2.13, p < .01; adults,
t(30) = 9.23, p < .001.

Discussion
The present experiment tested competing predictions of two
accounts of the smaller errors on choice trials in Experiment 1.
3

Again, to compare with the findings of Huttenlocher et al.
(1994, Experiment 6), we fit curves to the continuous draw data.
The fit of a quintic function to children’s continuous draw data in
the present experiment was excellent (R2 = .96). This fit was higher than the fit reported by Huttenlocher et al. (R2 = .90).

Figure 4. Mean choice and draw errors for (A) 7-year-olds (7yr) and (B) adults (AD) across the 11 target
locations in Experiment 2. Positive values indicate rightward errors, and negative values indicate leftward
errors. Errors bars reflect plus or minus one standard error.
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Table 2
R2

Values of Polynomial Curve Fits in Experiment 2

Response

Quintic function Cubic function Linear function

7-year-olds’ draw
7-year-olds’ choice
Adults’ draw
Adults’ choice

.946a >>
.912a >
.930a >
.959a >

.800 a >
.875a >
.880a >
.892a >

.017
.025
.291
.444a

Note. Quintic functions marked with >> fit significantly better (p < .05)
than both cubic, FS(2, 5) > 5.79, and linear, FS(4, 5) > 5.19, functions.
Quintic functions marked with > fit significantly better than only a linear function. Cubic functions marked with > fit significantly better than
linear functions; FS(2, 7) > 4.74.
a Curve fits significantly greater than chance, quintic F (5, 5) > 5.05, cubic
S
FS(3, 7) > 4.35, and linear FS(1, 9) > 5.12.

Results are not consistent with the proposal that children were biased against using geometric information in verbal tasks. Rather,
results support the proposal that the spatial span of the choice set
limited participants’ choice response errors in the previous experiment. Choice and draw responses in the present experiment did
not differ significantly, and responses from both trial types showed
a strong and significant sinusoidal pattern. It is important to note
that this was the case for both children and adults, suggesting developmental continuity in the processes that underlie performance
in this task (see also Spencer & Hund, 2003).
The present results demonstrate that geometric biases are not
unique to sensorimotor responses in spatial recall tasks. This has
important implications for the CA and DFT models: It suggests
that the processes captured by these models might generalize to
verbal responses in recognition tasks. Before these implications
were evaluated in detail, however, it was first necessary to address
one final empirical issue. To test the choice span account in the
present experiment, we increased the number of choices from five
to nine. This increased the spatial span of the choice set, but it also
increased the number of options from which participants had to
choose. Consequently, the increase in geometric bias on choice trials might have resulted from the increased spatial span or a general increase in task difficulty. We tested these possibilities in Experiment 3.

Experiment 3
To determine whether the different pattern of results on choice
trials across Experiments 1 and 2 was driven by the number of
choices or the spatial span of the choices, we used a choice response set with five choices (as in Experiment 1) covering a 40mm span (as in Experiment 2). If the number of choices caused
the differences across experiments, then the results of Experiment
3 should be similar to those of Experiment 1; that is, choice and
draw responses should differ significantly. Alternatively, if the
spatial span of the choices caused the differences across experiments, then the results of Experiment 3 should be similar to those
of Experiment 2; that is, we should find similar patterns of error
on both choice and draw trials.

Method
Participants. Participants were 30 seven-year-olds (M age = 7.55
years, SD = 0.96 months) and 30 adults (M age = 19.54 years, SD = 11.97

months). All other participant details were the same as in Experiments 1
and 2.
Apparatus. All details of the apparatus were the same as in Experiment
1 except for the choice response cards. These cards had five choices, separated by 10 mm (rather than 5 mm).
Procedure and experimental design. The procedure and design were
identical to those used in Experiment 2.
Method of analysis. Choice responses were coded using the method described in Experiment 1. Choices covered the same spatial range as in Experiment 2, but now errors could occur only in 10-mm increments (the
distance between two choices). As a result, the maximum error was ±30
mm. Continuous draw error was coded the same way as in the previous
experiments. Categorical draw error was calculated by rounding the continuous draw errors to 10 mm and truncating to ±30 mm. As in Experiments 1 and 2, statistical analyses revealed no significant differences between continuous and categorical draw errors, so categorical draw errors
were used in all analyses.

Results
Figure 5 shows mean errors for both response types separately
for children (Figure 5A) and adults (Figure 5B). Responses generally followed a sinusoidal pattern as in Experiments 1 and 2,
with small errors at the center of the rectangle (100 mm) and near
the centers of each half (50 mm and 150 mm). In addition, adults’
errors were noticeably smaller than 7-year-olds’ errors, as in Experiment 1 but not Experiment 2.
A three-way ANOVA with response type (choice or draw) and
location (37.5–162.5 mm) as within-subject factors and age (7
years or adult) as a between-subjects factor revealed a significant main effect of location, Wilks’s Λ = .59, F(10, 49) = 3.38,
p < .01, and a significant Location × Age interaction, Wilks’s Λ
= .69, F(10, 49) = 2.23, p < .05. As in Experiment 2, there were
no significant effects of response type. Adults’ errors were generally smaller than children’s across the sinusoidal pattern, although
tests of simple effects showed a significant effect of age only at
one location, 50 mm, F(1, 58) = 4.82, p < .05. Additional tests of
simple effects indicated that there was a significant modulation of
error across locations for 7-year-olds, F(10, 290) = 3.36, p < .001,
and adults, F(10, 290) = 5.40, p < .001.
The central goal of Experiment 3 was to compare response errors
on the choice trials in the present experiment with performance
when participants chose from (a) the same number of choices over
a small spatial span (Experiment 1) and (b) more choices over the
same spatial span (Experiment 2). To examine the effects of spatial
span, we compared the choice responses in Experiments 1 and 3
in a three-way ANOVA with location (37.5–162.5 mm) as a within-subject factor and age (7 years or adult) and experiment (1 or
3) as between-subjects factors. We report only significant effects
of experiment. The ANOVA revealed a significant Location × Experiment interaction, F(10, 1160) = 2.53, p < .01. Tests of simple
effects indicated that responses at two locations differed significantly across experiments: 75 mm, F(1, 118) = 3.95, p < .05, and
137.5 mm, F(1, 118) = 4.47, p < .05. At both of these locations, errors were larger in the present experiment than in Experiment 1.
It is important to note that these locations are near the inflection
points of the sinusoidal pattern. Next, we examined the influence
of the number of choices by comparing the choice responses in
Experiments 2 and 3 in a three-way ANOVA. There were no significant effects of experiment. These analyses, in conjunction with
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the absence of significant response type effects in the present experiment, suggest that spatial span—and not the number of choices—is a central contributor to geometric effects in the choice task.
Polynomial curve-fitting. As in the previous experiments, we
fit polynomial curves to participants’ responses. Table 3 shows R2
values for the fits of quintic, cubic, and linear functions fit separately for each age and response type as well as significant differences in the fits of these curves. As in Experiments 1 and 2, the
best fit for children’s draw data was obtained by a quintic function, though the fit of the cubic function was also quite good.4 The
same was true of adults’ draw responses. For children’s choice
data, there was no significant difference between the fits of quin-
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tic, cubic, and linear functions, and none of these functions fit children’s responses significantly above chance levels. By contrast,
cubic and linear functions fit adults’ choice data at levels that were
significantly better than chance. This pattern of results is similar to
that seen in Experiment 1, raising the possibility that, although the
number of choices did not emerge as an important factor on the
4 Again, to compare with the findings of Huttenlocher et al. (1994,
Experiment 6), we fit curves to our continuous draw data. The fit of
a quintic function to children’s continuous draw data in the present
experiment was quite good (R2 = .92) and comparable to results from
Huttenlocher et al.

Figure 5. Mean choice and draw errors for (A) 7-year-olds (7yr) and (B) adults (AD) across the 11 target
locations in Experiment 3. Positive values indicate rightward errors, and negative values indicate leftward
errors. Errors bars reflect plus or minus one standard error.
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Table 3
R2 Values of Polynomial Curve Fits in Experiment 3
Response

Quintic function Cubic function Linear function

7-year-olds’ draw
7-year-olds’ choice
Adults’ draw
Adults’ choice

.957a >>
.605
.945a >>
.780

.804 a >
.374
.741a
.770a

.001
.084
.460
.496a

Note. Quintic functions marked with >> fit significantly better (p < .05)
than both cubic, FS(2, 5) > 5.79, and linear, FS(4, 5) > 5.19, functions.
Quintic functions marked with > fit significantly better than only a linear function. Cubic functions marked with > fit significantly better than
linear functions, FS(2, 7) > 4.74.
a Curve fits significantly greater than chance, quintic F (5, 5) > 5.05, cubic
S
FS(3, 7) > 4.35, and linear FS(1, 9) > 5.12.

basis of the cross-experiment ANOVAs above, this task factor may
play some role in choice responses. Note, however, that children
and adults made very small errors to one target location on the
choice task—125 mm. Responses to all other targets showed relatively close correspondence across tasks. Given that curve fits take
into account only mean responses (thus, we had relatively few degrees of freedom), the reduction in error at 125 mm likely played a
substantial role in the nonsignificant quintic fits. In this context, it
is worth noting that the fit of the quintic function approached significance for the children (.605; see Table 3) and was higher than
the quintic fit from Experiment 1 (.453).
Percentage of correct responses on choice trials. In a final set
of analyses, we examined the percentage of correct responses on
choice trials. A t test comparing the mean percentage of correct
responses across the two age groups revealed a significant difference, t(58) = –8.03, p < .001. As in the previous experiments,
adults (M = 73.0%) were correct more often than children (M =
35.8%). Additionally, t tests comparing the performance of each
age group to chance (20%) indicated that both groups performed
at levels significantly above chance: children, t(29) = 4.45, p <
.001; adults, t(29) = 17.66, p < .001. It is interesting that the percentage of correct responses in the present experiment was noticeably higher than in Experiment 1 (adults: M = 56.9%, children:
M = 30.0%), despite the fact that both experiments included the
same number of choices. To examine this issue directly, we conducted a two-way ANOVA with age (7 years or adult) and experiment (1 or 3) as between-subjects factors. This analysis revealed a
significant main effect of experiment, F(1, 116) = 11.29, p < .001.
Participants in Experiment 3 (M = 54.4%) were correct significantly more often than in Experiment 1 (M = 43.5%). Considered
together with mean error on the choice trials, these results indicate
how spatial span affects response error in the choice task: Spatial
span makes choices more distinctive as evidenced by the higher
percentage of correct responses, but there is a cost of this distinctiveness—when participants err, they make large geometric errors
that are consistent with biases in the draw task.

Discussion
This experiment examined whether the spatial span of the choices or the number of choices drove the substantial geometric biases
in the choice task of Experiment 2. Results suggest that the spatial span of the choices played a major role in this finding. We saw

comparable geometric biases across choice and draw responses
in the current experiment. Moreover, cross-experiment comparisons showed a significant increase in error on the choice task at
the inflection points of the sinusoidal pattern in this experiment
relative to Experiment 1 and no significant differences in error
on the choice task across Experiments 2 and 3. These results lend
strong support for the choice span account discussed previously.
By that view, participants in the choice task select the choice that
most closely matches where memory has drifted during the delay.
With a larger spatial span, it is more likely that a choice will overlap with where memory has drifted, even when there are relatively
few choices from which to pick.
Although our results suggest that the spatial span of the choices
is critical, the number of choices does seem to play a role as well.
Participants selected the correct choice more often when there
were fewer choices (i.e., in Experiments 1 and 3 vs. Experiment
2), particularly when the choices were farther apart (Experiment
3). This latter effect was likely caused by the spatial distinctiveness of the choices. It is important to note, however, that we still
found evidence of geometric biases on the choice task despite the
small number of choices from which to select. One final collection
of results contributes to this distinctiveness story: Adults showed
significantly smaller errors than 7-year-olds in the present experiment, and they showed a dramatic increase in percentage of correct responses relative to Experiment 1. This finding suggests that
adults capitalized on the distinctiveness of the choices more so
than did children. This is consistent with recent proposals that the
spatial precision of spatial memory increases systematically over
development (e.g., Hund & Plumert, 2002; Schutte et al., 2003;
Spencer & Hund, 2003). We discuss these findings in greater detail below.

General Discussion
The purpose of this study was to examine the nature of the memory system that underlies performance when people use spatial
memory to form different response types in the presence of different response cues. In particular, we asked whether one type of
bias—geometric bias—observed in spatial recall tasks with pointing responses generalizes to a recognition task with a verbal response. If so, it would suggest that the processes that produce geometric biases—processes formalized in models of spatial recall—
might be general as well.
Across three experiments, our results clearly show that geometric biases generalize to verbal responses in a recognition task.
This was most clearly shown in Experiment 2, in which both
children and adults showed robust geometric biases across
the draw and choice tasks. However, we also found evidence
that the structure of the choice set contributes to the errors participants make in the verbal task. For both age groups, geometric biases in the verbal task were robust in Experiment 2 with a
large spatial span and nine choices, weaker in Experiment 3 with
a large span and fewer choices, and the weakest in Experiment
1 with a small span and only five choices. These choice dependencies were most dramatic for the 7-year-olds, who showed little evidence of geometric bias in Experiment 1. It is important to
note, however, that deviations between choice and draw responses
were systematic for both age groups—choice responses were con-
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sistently smaller near the inflection points of the sinusoidal pattern. Spatial span also influenced participants’ percentage of correct responses. Percentage of correct responses was higher in Experiment 3 relative to Experiment 1, suggesting that, particularly for adults, the spatial distinc-tiveness of the choices matters.
It is important to note that the choice task we used here differed in multiple ways from the spatial recall task. First, we asked
participants to verbally label locations rather than to point—a response difference common in tasks that contrast the “cognitive”
and “sensorimotor” systems described above (e.g., Bridgeman et
al., 2000; Brungart et al., 2000). Second, the choice task required
recognition of the correct location from a set of simultaneously
viewable alternatives, rather than recall of the location in an empty rectangle. Although our experiments did not isolate the different
contributions of these factors, results demonstrate that geometric
biases generalize across these differences. The next challenge is
to explain how the different factors may have contributed to both
the generalization of bias across tasks and the subtle differences
that emerged over development as we manipulated the choice set.
We contend that formal models can help meet this challenge by
specifying not only whether different factors contributed to performance but also how. Thus, in the sections that follow, we evaluate
two central issues. First, given that geometric biases generalized
to the choice task, can the CA and DFT models account for our results, and do these models offer insights into the factors that give
rise to both the presence and absence of geometric biases across
experiments? Second, what are the implications of these results
for views that posit two spatial memory systems and discontinuous changes in spatial abilities over development?

Models of Spatial Recall and Geometric Bias in the
Choice Task
The CA model. According to the CA model, geometric biases
arise because people weight prototypical information more heavily than less certain fine-grained information after short-term delays
(Huttenlocher et al., 1991; Spencer & Hund, 2002). How might
these ideas be applied to the choice task? Central to this question
is how people use the choice set, that is, how people combine finegrained, categorical, and choice information to form a response.
One possibility is that people use only fine-grained and choice information when generating a response in the verbal task. This idea
stems from the proposal discussed earlier that geometric information might be less relevant (or simply used less often) in verbal
tasks. Results from Experiment 2 demonstrate that this is not the
case in all situations. What might determine when to use categorical information? One likely factor is the certainty of the choice
set. With many choices present (Experiment 2), choice-related
spatial information would be less certain, and participants might
weight prototypical information more heavily. It is important to
note, however, that this idea does not appear to capture differences
between Experiments 1 and 3. When the choices were more distinctive (Experiment 3), which would presumably lead to greater
certainty, we saw stronger geometric biases, not the reverse.
Another possibility is that certainty scales only with the number
of choices and not the spatial range. In this case, the weighting of
the three types of information would be the same in Experiments
1 and 3. What, then, might explain the different outcomes in these
experiments? It is possible that these outcomes reflect the cost of
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discretization error in the two situations, that is, error resulting
from mapping continuous spatial information onto a discrete response set. For instance, when participants were deciding between
two adjacent choices in Experiments 1 and 3, categorical information could occasionally tip the balance in favor of a geometrically
biased choice. It is important that the cost of making such a choice
would be different in the two experiments—5 mm in Experiment
1 versus 10 mm in Experiment 3. Thus, the same weighting process could produce larger geometric biases in Experiment 3 simply because of the structure of the choice set.
Although these ideas are promising, implementing them in the
CA model is not straightforward. For instance, adding a third cue
to the model with a particular weighting strength would tend to
produce responses in between the options in the choice set. This,
of course, never occurs in experiment. There are at least two ways
to handle this. First, one could implement a postweighting stage
that discretizes the continuous spatial response, mapping space to
the most appropriately positioned color in the task space. A second
possibility is that weighting occurs in a two-stage process (for a
sequential view of spatial language use, see Carlson-Radvansky &
Logan, 1997; Logan & Sadler, 1996). First, fine-grained and categorical information is weighted on the basis of certainty of the
fine-grained information. This would produce a best guess of the
remembered location along continuous spatial dimensions. Then,
this response could be discretized by combining it with the choice
set in a winner-take-all fashion. Both of these seem like reasonable additions to the CA model; however, they highlight the need
to formally consider the nature of recognition responses within
this modeling framework.
A final question is whether the CA model can capture the developmental changes we observed. As with several other studies in the spatial recall literature, we found that children generally showed larger geometric errors in the draw task than did
adults (Huttenlocher et al., 1994; Plumert & Hund, 2001; Spencer & Hund, 2003). This finding might indicate that children have
a less accurate fine-grained representation of the target location
(Hund & Plumert, 2002; Huttenlocher et al., 1994). Consequently,
they weight categorical information more heavily. It is interesting,
however, that adults showed a more consistent use of categorical
information in the verbal task across experiments. This fits with
a recent proposal by Hund and Plumert (2002). These researchers proposed that adults show robust categorical biases in different situations because they have learned over development that the
use of categorical information leads to an overall reduction in response error. Similarly, Huttenlocher, Hedges, and Vevea (2000)
placed the CA model in a Bayesian framework in which the use of
categorical information in adulthood leads to an optimal trade-off
between bias and variable error.
The DFT. The starting point for a dynamic field account of the
data presented here was discussed previously: Participants might
pick the choice that most closely matches the location to which
memory has drifted after the delay. Recent ideas proposed by Wilimzig and Schöner (2005, 2006) to capture categorical responding
with the DFT allow us to make this idea more concrete. Figure 6
shows simulations of a dynamic field model performing the choice
task (note that this model is a simplification of our more general theory of SWM described by Spencer and colleagues: Spencer et al., in press; Spencer & Schöner, 2006). Two fields are displayed within each panel—an SWM field (uswm) and an exci-
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tatory long-term memory field (ultm). All of the simulations in Figure 6 show performance when the target is presented at a single
location, 25 mm to the right of midline (midline was at Unit 150
and Target 125 was at Unit 225; thus, 5 units along the x-axes
are equivalent to 1 mm in the task space). We selected this location because we saw large differences between choice and draw
responses near 75 and 125 mm in the present study. Note that as
a final simplification, reference-related long-term memory inputs
around the midline axis were captured by static excitatory and inhibitory inputs (in contrast to the dynamic long-term memory inputs in Spencer et al., in press; Spencer & Schöner, 2006).
As a first step toward describing the full set of simulation results in Figure 6, consider what is depicted in each individual
simulation. Each simulation begins with the presentation of a target 25 mm to the right of midline. This target-related input creates
a peak of activation at the target location in the SWM field, which,
in turn, increases activation at the associated location in long-term
memory. After 4 s (400 time steps in the model), the target input is
turned off, and the peak in SWM drifts away from midline (away
from Location 150) during the 10-s delay. Next, the choices are input to the model. This is accompanied by a lowering of the resting
level of neurons in SWM, moving the field into “choice” mode.
This effectively destroys the target-related activation peak, allowing the choices to structure activation in SWM. Finally, we raised
the resting level. As a consequence, the field “chooses” one of the
choice inputs; that is, the SWM field forms a peak centered at one
of the choices. This is reflected by the activation peak at the end of
each simulation.

Given this method for generating a choice response with the
DFT, can this model capture results from the present study? The
entire set of simulations depicted in Figure 6 provides an initial
sketch of the full account. The simulations in the left column depict 7-year-olds’ performance across Experiments 1-3, and the
simulations in the right column depict adults’ performance across
the three experiments. The model parameters used for each age
group were held constant across the three experiments, and the details of the choice input were changed to match our experimental manipulations: five close choices in Experiment 1, nine close
choices in Experiment 2, and five choices far apart in Experiment
3. Across the two age groups, we manipulated the spatial precision of the local excitation/lateral inhibition function that governs
neural interactions in SWM. Spencer and colleagues (Schutte et
al., 2003; Spencer & Hund, 2003) have proposed that local excitatory interactions are stronger and more precise later in development with strong, narrow lateral inhibition. The interaction functions used in the simulations are depicted in the inset graphs at the
top of Figure 6. All other model parameters were identical across
age groups.
Given the changes in neural interaction and the structure of the
choice set used here, analyses of the DFT suggest that two factors
influenced choice performance in this study. The first factor is the
amount of memory drift for the two age groups. As can be seen in
Figure 6, the 7-year-old model’s memory for the target location
drifts dramatically during the memory delay, consistent with the
large draw errors reported here and the large spatial recall errors
reported in previous studies (see, e.g.. Spencer & Hund, 2003). By

Figure 6. Simulations of the dynamic field theory for a 7-year-old (left column) and an adult (right column)
for each experiment. The spatial working memory field, u-swm(x), and the long-term memory field, u-ltm(x),
are shown for each simulation. Insets at the top of each column of simulations show the local excitation/lateral
inhibition function used for each age group.
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contrast, the adult model’s memory drifts much less during the delay, consistent with the significantly smaller errors for the adults
in Experiments 1 and 3 and with data from previous studies (see
Spencer & Hund, 2002). The difference in delay-dependent drift
in the model results from the difference in neural interaction— activation peaks in the adult model are more precise and more stable. Consequently, they are less influenced by the inhibitory component of the midline input.
Drift in SWM plays a critical role in choice selection because
it structures activation in the long-term memory field. It is the
activation in this latter field that tips the balance in favor of one
choice over another (recall that the target-related peak of activation in SWM is destroyed at the start of the choice interval). As
can be seen in Figure 6, the large memory drift of the 7-year-old
model produces a broadly distributed pattern of activation in longterm memory, whereas the small memory drift of the adult model
produces a more focused activation pattern in long-term memory
that is closer to the correct target location.
The second factor that affects choice responses is that the model is biased to select one of the central choices when the choices are close together (Experiments 1 and 2); that is, the model
is biased against selecting the outermost choices. Note that the
model shows a bias against the outermost choices even though
the choices input to the model did not overlap. This occurs because the input provided by the choices blends slightly given
the (im)precision of locally excitatory interactions. The blending means the activation on either edge of the inner choice inputs is higher than activation on the outer edges of the outermost
choices. This gives a competitive advantage to the inner choices.
It is important that this occurs only when the choices are close
together, as we demonstrate below. In addition, this bias is stronger for the 7-year-old model given that local excitatory interactions are less precise (see insets in Figure 6).
Taken together, these two factors explain the pattern of simulation results in Figure 6 and provide insights into results of the
present study. Consider the performance of the 7-year-old model
first. As can be seen in the top left panel of Figure 6, the 7-yearold model selected the correct choice on this trial from Experiment 1. This occurred because memory drifted beyond the choice
set, and the model was biased against selecting the rightmost (the
outermost) choice. Note that this is consistent with our empirical
findings: Children in Experiment 1 did not perform significantly above chance on the control trials, suggesting that they were
biased against selecting an outermost choice. Note also that it is
likely that children’s memory drifted beyond the choice set relatively frequently in Experiment 1. As evidence, we conducted a
follow-up analysis of the data from Experiment 1, excluding data
from locations where memory was unlikely to drift (37.5, 50, 100,
150, and 167.5 mm). Using children’s draw responses as an index
of where memory drifted for each target location, we found that
memory drifted beyond the choice set on 30% of all choice trials.
Children picked the closest choice (the outermost choice) on 28%
of these trials, whereas they picked the second closest choice on
47% of these trials. Thus, a microanalysis of children’s responses
is consistent with the behavior of the model.
The second panel in the left column of Figure 6 shows the 7year-old model’s performance in a trial from Experiment 2. Here,
the model makes a geometrically biased error by selecting the option two choices to the right of the target. As can be seen in the
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simulation, with nine choices, it is quite likely that there will be a
choice in the spatial region to which memory has drifted. This can
explain why we found no significant differences between choice
and draw responses in this experiment. Finally, in the simulation
of a trial from Experiment 3, the 7-year-old model makes a geometrically biased error one choice to the right of the target (see
Figure 6). As in Experiment 1, with five choices, there is less of
a chance that there will be a choice located in the region to which
memory has drifted. This would tend to produce more accurate
responses in the choice task. In contrast to Experiment 1, however, the model shows less of a bias against the outermost choices.
These two tendencies combined might explain the mixed results in
this experiment—we found not only a higher percentage of correct
responses for the 7-year-olds but also a greater tendency to show
geometric biases in the choice task relative to Experiment 1.
What about the adults? Given the smaller memory drift in
the adult model, there is a greater likelihood that there will be a
choice that overlaps the location where memory has drifted. Thus,
we would expect to see more systematic geometric biases in the
choice task for the adults. This is consistent with our empirical
results. Nevertheless, as can be seen in the simulation in Figure 6, such geometric biases will be countered in Experiment 1
by the bias against choosing an outermost choice. This might be
the source of the smaller geometric biases in the choice task in
this experiment. Note that this bias would play the strongest role
where memory drift is the largest—at the inflection points of the
sinusoidal pattern.
In Experiment 2, we saw robust geometric biases. As can be
seen in Figure 6, this is the case with the model as well: The adult
model makes a geometrically biased error by selecting the option
one choice to the right of the target. It is noteworthy that this bias
is smaller than the bias seen with the 7-year-old model. Although
this is not consistent with our statistical findings, it is consistent
with the smaller errors for the adults in Figure 4. Finally, in Experiment 3, we found that adults picked the correct choice quite
often. This is the case with the model as well. Note, however, that
the activation peak in the bottom right panel of Figure 6 is close to
the outermost target. Thus, in some cases, it is likely that the model will select the geometrically biased choice because of stochastic
fluctuations in activation in SWM. As discussed above, this type
of digitization error will result in a large error, which could explain the significant geometric bias in Experiment 3 even in the
context of a higher percentage of correct responses.
In summary, the simulation results in Figure 6 provide useful
insights into the performance of both age groups in the present
study. Nevertheless, it is important to note that these insights are
qualitative in nature given the lack of quantitative fits. We did not
pursue such fits because of practical constraints. To quantitatively
model results from this study with the process-oriented approach
described here, we would have had to conduct close to 10,000
simulations (50 simulations at each of 11 target locations × 2 age
groups × 3 selected orientations of the choice set × 3 experiments).
Given this unwieldy number of simulations, a more practical approach to the challenge of quantitative simulations would be to
conduct more focused empirical studies designed to test specific
aspects of the account provided here.
In this context, we return to an issue raised previously: Given
that the choice task differed in several ways from the draw task,
does the DFT offer insights into how these differences contributed
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to performance? Central to our account are the processes that select a single discrete item from the choice set input to the model. Thus, our account suggests that the presence of several simultaneously available alternatives played a critical role in the task.
This predicts that we should see fewer differences between spatial recall performance and performance in a same/different recognition task in which participants must identify whether a single probe item matches a target item after a delay. This is indeed
the case (see Simmering, Spencer, & Schöner, in press; Werner &
Diedrichsen, 2002).
Does this indicate that verbal responses per se (e.g., saying “red”
or “same”) are unimportant? The answer is no. Indeed, Spencer et
al. (in press) recently demonstrated that the same biases reported
here arose in a task in which participants had to verbally judge
whether a target object was above a reference object. We suspect
that the use of spatial prepositions can modify the stability of the
SWM processes captured by the DFT. Given that apparently simple changes in the task can lead to a complex pattern of results,
the larger message of our model is that a formal understanding of
the processes that give rise to performance can make an important
contribution to understanding spatial cognition.

Implications for the Two-Memory-Systems Account
According to the two-spatial-systems view (Milner & Goodale,
1995), spatial cognition can be partitioned into a sensorimotor
system that encodes locations in the service of motor actions and
a cognitive system that encodes locations in the service of verbal responses (Bridgeman, 1999; Bridgeman et al., 1981). This distinction is derived from evidence for two cortical pathways for visual information: a ventral stream for picking up information related to object identification and a dorsal stream for handling visual information for action (Lacquaniti et al., 1997; Milner & Goodale, 1995; Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982). It is important that behavioral evidence from experiments with normal populations also
supports this distinction. For instance, adults’ verbal responses
show the Titchner circles illusion (Ebbinghaus illusion): A circle
appears to be larger if it is surrounded by smaller circles than if
it is surrounded by larger circles. Nevertheless, participants correctly shape their grip when reaching to one of the circles (Aglioti, DeSouza, & Goodale, 1995), even when reaching to remembered circles, that is, when vision of the hand is occluded during
the reach (Haffenden & Goodale, 1998).
There are many recent behavioral tests of the two-systems
view (e.g., Bridgeman et al., 1997, 2000; Haffenden & Goodale, 1998; Proffitt et al., 1995) and an accompanying set of tests
that argue against this distinction (e.g., Franz, Bulthoff, & Fahle, 2003; Franz, Gegenfurtner, Bülthoff, & Fahle, 2000; Smeets
& Brenner, 2001; Vishton & Fabre, 2003; Vishton, Rea, Cutting,
& Nuñez, 1999). The question here is whether the present results
have implications for the two-systems proposal. To answer this,
we must first consider which memory systems are used in the
draw and choice tasks. The drawing task required a sensorimotor response implicating dorsal stream processes, whereas the
choice task required a verbal response implicating ventral stream
processes. This view is qualified, however, by the type of bias
examined—geometric bias. Although geometric bias increases
systematically over delay (see Spencer & Hund, 2002)—a hallmark characteristic of the sensorimotor system (see also Bridge-

man et al., 1981; Brungart et al., 2000)—such biases are clearly
grounded in an allocentric reference frame. According to Milner
and Goodale (1995), this places geometric biases squarely within the ventral stream.
To successfully perform the drawing task, however, people
must integrate and coordinate information from both processing
streams, taking an allocentric memory of the target location and
using it to move the hand in a body-centered reference frame (Milner & Goodale, 1995). Although results of the present study indicate little about how such coordination takes place, the model used here—the DFT—does. In particular, the simulations presented in Figure 6 show how a single integrated dynamical system
can generate both sensorimotor recall responses and verbal choice
responses within the same SWM field. Additionally, recent work
in autonomous robotics shows how the dynamic field framework
can be used to govern the behavior of an autonomous agent as it
navigates through the world (Bicho, Mallet, & Schöner, 2000). It
is important to note that this requires the real-time coordination of
egocentric and allocentric reference frames, a central challenge to
the integration of dorsal and ventral stream processes (for related
work, see Pouget, Deneve, & Duhamel, 2002). Note that applications of the dynamic field framework do not challenge neurophysiological evidence of dorsal and ventral visual pathways; rather,
such applications suggest that solutions to the challenge of integration are within reach.

Implications for Spatial Cognitive Development
Comparisons of children’s and adults’ responses in the present study revealed a shifting pattern of developmental differences across experiments. Adults’ errors were significantly smaller
than 7-year-olds’ errors in Experiments 1 and 3, but this was not
the case in Experiment 2. These results underscore the point that
developmental differences must be considered relative to the constraints provided by the task. It is important to emphasize, however, that children and adults remembered locations for different delays in the present study. We did this to make the task more
manageable for children yet still reveal robust biases with adults.
Clearly, the difference in delays qualifies the lack of significant
age-related differences in Experiment 2.
Although we found a complex pattern of developmental results, simulations of the DFT suggest that this model can capture
these details through developmental changes in the spatial precision of neural interactions. This adds to the growing list of findings captured by this “spatial precision hypothesis” (see Schutte
et al., 2003; Spencer & Hund, 2003). In particular. Spencer and
colleagues have used this same parametric change in the model to account for both quantitative changes in A-not-B-type biases between 2 and 6 years (Schutte et al., 2003) and, more recently, qualitative changes in geometric biases between 3 and 5 years
(Schutte, 2004). Note, however, that the current results provide
only a limited window onto developmental continuity given that
we examined performance at two time points across a broad age
range. Nevertheless, it is certainly promising that we were able to
capture the performance of 7-year-olds and adults with a single
developmental change in the model.
Note also that our results do not address the issue of whether there are important discontinuities in development that occur
with the onset of proficient spatial language use (Hermer-Vazquez
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et al., 2001). We examined only one time point in early development, and our choice task included a very constrained use of
verbal labeling. This was by design to isolate whether verbal responses in a spatial recognition task would show geometric biases.
Clearly, however, it is critical to move beyond this in future extensions of the ideas presented here. For instance. Smith, Samuelson,
and Spencer (2006) are currently examining whether concepts of
the DFT can help explain how children use space to bind together
words and object features. Similarly, results from several recent
studies with adults have demonstrated that the DFT can capture
novel aspects of adults’ use of spatial prepositions such as above
(Spencer et al., in press).

Conclusion
The present study stands at the intersection of three literatures—
the literatures on spatial recall, the two-spatial-systems view, and
spatial cognitive development. Our results showing that geometric biases generalize across pointing and verbal response types in
both recall and recognition tasks suggest that greater cross-talk
among these literatures would be profitable. Indeed, such crosstalk might lead to a different view of the organization of spatial
behavior, one that emphasizes the task-specific integration of
“sensorimotor” and “cognitive” spatial behaviors rather than the
partitioning of behavior into separable subsystems that develop
in a discontinuous manner over development. We suggest that the
CA and DFT models offer an exciting starting point in this regard,
one that might ultimately move these literatures forward toward a
more formal, process-oriented future.
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